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C
hanges in climate policy have large infl uence on businesses. Firms anticipate 
and respond to such changes, but what if they have already engaged in a long-
term relationship with other fi rms or customers at the time of policy change? 
For example, coal supply to power stations is typically based on long-term contracts, 
while the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship may well be affected substantially 
by climate regulations. However, there has been little evidence on whether or how 
fi rms amend their contractual agreements in response to a change in policy.   
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New policy initiatives have the ability 
to substantially shift asset values within 
an economy.  As a result, entities which 
previously made investments tied to 
the initial state of affairs (for example 
capital developments, or long-term 
purchasing contracts) will be affected by 
any proposed policy changes.  To date, 
there is a lack of evidence concerning 
how these stakeholders contractually 
respond to the imposition of a change in 
policy.  
The hypothesis tested is that more 
fl exibility in a contract allows the 
parties more room to implicitly alter 
future transactions, thus making explicit 
renegotiation less likely.    
Using data on coal contracts that were in 
effect both when the 1990 CAAA passed 
and when it was implemented (1995), the 
fl exibility of these contracts and whether 
they were renegotiated was ascertained. 
With this information, the determinants 
of renegotiating a contract were 
estimated.  Results show that contracts 
which are most likely affected by the 
policy, those which allowed a wide range 
of sulphur to be delivered, are also the 
ones that are statistically more likely to 
be renegotiated. Support is also found 
for the hypothesis that more fl exible 
contracts are statistically less likely to be 
renegotiated.
From a policy perspective, this analysis 
is instructive in a couple of ways.  The 
similarities between sulphur and carbon 
emissions imply that this historical look 
back at the effect of the 1990 CAAA on 
long-term coal contracts is contemporary 
given the current policy debate 
concerning greenhouse gas emissions 
legislation and its resulting impact on 
the distribution of income.  Further, 
many economic-engineering models of 
the electricity sector have suggested that 
these long-term contracts are restricting 
the tradable permit markets ability to 
minimize the costs of this policy.  Our 
results do not support this conclusion; 
however it helps guide future research in 
this area to improve our understanding of 
tradable permits systems.
Surface coal mining in Wyoming in the United States.
This leaves policymakers without an 
objective evaluation of the impact of 
their proposals on stakeholders’ profi ts, 
compared to the claims they put forward.  
The research discussed here attempts to 
address this void by investigating how 
long-term contracts for coal delivery in 
the U.S. electricity generation industry 
responded to passage of the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments (CAAA).  More 
broadly, within the contextual example of 
coal contracts, we seek an understanding 
of what aspects of contract design affect 
the propensity to renegotiate when a 
policy shock occurs in the midst of a 
long-term contracting environment.
The 1990 CAAA initiated a system of 
tradable permits for sulphur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions, which increased the 
demand for low-sulphur coal and greatly 
reduced the demand for high-sulphur 
coal. SO2 is formed when the sulphur 
contained within the coal combines 
with oxygen during the combustion 
process similar to the formation of 
carbon dioxide. The coal contracts then 
in existence allowed a range of sulphur 
to be delivered in satisfaction of the 
contract terms.  In addition, contracts are 
written with inherently different degrees 
of fl exibility.  As 1991 Nobel Laureate 
in Economics Ronald Coase and 2009 
Nobel Laureate in Economics Oliver 
Willamson argue, contracts are costly to 
write thus many contingencies are left 
unspecifi ed which makes the agreement 
fl exible.  Flexibility in a contract 
can come from the price adjustment 
mechanism (fi xed price versus price 
re-opener provisions), the length of the 
agreement, and/or the minimum quantity 
deliverable.  
